



IV) Squeezing Liquids Absorbed in Food

Squeezing fruits or vegetables in order to extract their natural juices. is prohibited under the rubric of *mefarek* (extracting), a subcategory of *dash* (threshing). However, sometimes a food (*okhel*) may be saturated with a liquid (*mashkeh*) which it has absorbed, e.g., a pickle's juice or the oil in a doughnut or latke. Is the squeezing (*sechita*) of such foods permissible on Shabbat?

The Gemara (145a) deals with this question in the context of *kevashim* (pickled vegetables) and *shelakot* (boiled vegetables) and formulates the following rule: if the purpose of the *sechita* is *le-gufan*, for their own sake, i.e., in order to allow one to eat the vegetables without superfluous liquid, there is a consensus that squeezing them is permitted. However, if the aim of the *sechita* is "*le-meimeihen*," for their liquid, i.e., in order to use the liquid which is extracted from the vegetables, there is a dispute:

Shmuel said: "Whether *kevashim* or *shelakot*, for their own sake, it is permitted; for their liquid, it is forbidden but one is not liable..."

Rabbi Yochanan said: "Whether *kevashim* or *shelakot*, for their own sake, it is permitted; for their liquid, one is liable to bring a sin-offering."

What is the reason for this being permissible?


Rashi (ibid, s.v. *Le-gufo*) explains that one who does so does not violate *mefarek*, "Since he does not need the liquid." In other words, the entire nature of *mefarek* is removing something from its covering in order to use it, but when one does not need the extract, it is not included in *mefarek* at all. *Tosafot* (73b, s.v. *Ve-tzarikh la-etzim*) write, along the same lines, that this is not *derekh disha* (the way of threshing). The Ramban (111a, s.v. *Hai Mesokhraita*) and the Ran (41a, Rif, s.v. *U-Ifikakh*) also state that *sechita* such as this is not like *disha* at all. Even though the Sages do sometimes ban *sechita* of this sort, there is no such decree in the case of *kevashim* and *shelakot*.

However, *Tosafot* in *Ketubbot* (6a, s.v. *Hai Mesokhraita*) write that generally there is a prohibition of *mefarek* even if the person is not interested at all in the liquid which is being squeezed; only in the case of *kevashim* and *shelakot* the Sages allow *sechita*, since the liquid absorbed in them is not an

independent *mashkeh*, but rather part of the food. Even after it is extracted from the food, this liquid is considered *okhel* and not *mashkeh* (at least when one is not interested in it), and this is like extracting *okhel* from *okhel*, which is not forbidden because of *dash*.

Summary

To summarize, it is permissible to squeeze a vegetable or a fruit which has an absorbed liquid in it, if the aim is to eat the cooked food without liquid. Therefore, it is permissible to squeeze a doughnut or latke to remove the oil or a pickle in order to remove the "juice" within it (when one is not interested in the liquid). However, it is forbidden to squeeze a pickled or cooked vegetable in order to use the liquid, e.g., as a relish for bread.



V) Squeezing Produce into Food

The Gemara (144b) states that even though it is forbidden to squeeze produce on Shabbat, there is nevertheless a solution, quoted by Rav Yehuda in the name of Shmuel: "A person can squeeze a cluster of grapes into a pot [of food], but not into a[n empty] bowl."

The Gemara thus rules that although one may not squeeze grapes into an empty bowl, one may squeeze grapes into a vessel with food in it. Why is this latter case permitted?

Rashi (s.v. Le-tokh ha-kedeira)

It is self-evident that one does not want it for *mashkeh*, but for *okhel*; therefore, this is not the way of extracting it, and it is like separating *okhel* from *okhel*.

The Rosh in his rulings on the Gemara there (22:3) also follows this leniency, but in his *Responsa* (22:1), he cites the view of Rabbeinu Chananel that Shmuel's solution is not accepted halakhically (since, according to him, Rabbi Yochanan challenges it), and therefore it is forbidden to squeeze produce into food:

Now you know that it is a dispute of the greats: Rabbeinu Chananel's halakhic ruling follows Rabbi Yochanan... and he says that Rabbi Yochanan disputes Shmuel's view. On the other hand, Rav Alfasi [i.e., the Rif] follows Shmuel, and who would stick his head between the mountains? Whoever is stringent is praiseworthy!

The Rosh cites this dispute and recommends being stringent in this matter, for "Who would stick his head between the mountains?" — i.e., who would dare to wade into a dispute between these pillars of halakhic authority: the Rif and the Rambam on the lenient side and Rabbeinu Chananel on the stringent side?

However, the halakhic ruling of the *Shulchan Arukh* (320:4) is to be lenient in accordance with the Rif and the Rambam (this seems to be the Rosh's inclination as well):

It is permissible to squeeze a cluster of grapes into a pot which has a cooked food in it in order to improve the food, because this is *mashkeh* entering *okhel*, and it has the status of *okhel*; however, if there is no food in it, this is forbidden.

Based on this ruling, it would appear that one may squeeze grapes into food. However, in a subsequent ruling (7), the *Shulchan Arukh* cites the view of Rabbeinu Chananel: it is prohibited to squeeze cooked vegetables into a pot even if there is food in it. The Rema adds that, according to this view, squeezing grapes into the pot is also forbidden:

In the view of Rabbeinu Chananel, whenever the liquid is needed, one is liable to bring a sin-offering even if one squeezes into a pot that contains food.

According to him, one who squeezes a cluster of grapes into a pot violates the *melakha* of *dash*.

The *Mishna Berura* (17, 30) writes that the *Shulchan Arukh* adds the view of Rabbeinu Chananel in order to indicate that although essentially one may be lenient in this matter, whoever is stringent is praiseworthy.

In practice, regarding olives or grapes, one should be stringent and refrain from squeezing them directly into food, in accordance with the view of the *Mishna Berura*. However, when it comes to *sechita* of other produce (which is forbidden only rabbinically), and certainly when it comes to the squeezing of a lemon (which in some views is never forbidden, because lemon juice is not a stand-alone drink), it appears that one may be lenient and permit squeezing them into food. This is the ruling of the *Chayei Adam* (14:3).

In any case, one must squeeze directly into a salad or other food, not into an empty cup or into a drink, even if one's intent is to transfer the liquid immediately to the food (*Mishna Berura* 320:18).

Sechita into Sugar for a Drink

Is it permissible to squeeze a lemon into sugar (into *okhel* which would be permitted) if one's intent is to pour the sugar into a drink (*mashkeh* which would be prohibited)?

Radvaz, in his *Responsa* (Vol. I, Ch. 10:

I have become accustomed to squeeze lemons onto sugar before putting water on it, because this is *mashkeh* going into *okhel*, and it is permissible.

The *Mishna Berura* (22) rules in accordance with this leniency. The *Ben Ish Chai* (Year 2, Yitro 5) writes that according to this one who wants to make lemonade on Shabbat must squeeze the lemon into the sugar first, and only after that may one add the water; his mnemonic is "And behold a ladder (*sullam*) was standing on the ground" (Bereishit 28:12) — "*sullam*" standing for sugar, lemon, *mayim* (water).

However, the *Chazon Ish* (56:7) disputes this. According to him, since the lemon is ultimately designated to be added to water, it is considered *mashkeh* and not *okhel*, and this is extracting *mashkeh* from *mashkeh*:

To squeeze a lemon onto sugar... if one's intent is to put the sugar into water, it appears that this *sechita* is forbidden; since one's intent is for *mashkeh*, it is considered *mashkeh*... However, if one needs to give lemon juice to a child for medical purposes, one should do so.

Thus, the *Chazon Ish* prohibits this practice, allowing it only for the sake of "a child for medical purposes".

Squeezing Produce into Food

Shmuel: One may squeeze grapes into food

Rabbeinu Chananel: The halakha is not like Shmuel (but like Rabbi Yochanan), and it is forbidden to squeeze even into food.

Rif, Rambam: This is the law. The reason is that since one's aim is eating, this is separating *okhel* from *okhel* and permissible.

Mishna Berura: Whoever is stringent is praiseworthy (because the Shulchan Arukh cites Rabbeinu Chananel's view).

Shulchan Arukh: This is the halakha.

One may squeeze fruit other than grapes and olives into food (because squeezing other produce even into an empty vessel is forbidden only rabbinically).

Squeezing Lemon onto Sugar to Put in a Drink

Chazon Ish: Forbidden, because the aim is mixing it with a liquid

Radvaz, Mishna Berura: Permissible

There is room to be lenient with lemons, as there are those who are lenient even if the vessel is empty, but it is good to put in a (clean) slice of lemon instead of squeezing.

VI) Sucking Produce

Rabbi Eliezer of Metz, the *Yere'im* (Ch. 274, 133a), writes that there is a Torah prohibition to suck juice from fruit:

I am concerned that one who puts meat in soup or soaks bread in wine and then puts it back in one's mouth to suck the liquid out will be liable for this — all the more so, one should not use one's mouth to suck liquid from grapes and the like.

However, the **Baal Ha-ittur** (*Hilkhot Yom Tov*, 12) disputes this because "it is not *derekh sechita* with one's mouth."

Presumably, even if we do not follow the ruling of the *Yere'im* that there is a Torah prohibition (at least for olives and grapes), one should forbid the matter at least rabbinically because even *melakha* with an alteration is forbidden by rabbinical law. Apparently, according to the *Baal Ha-ittur*, *sechita* by mouth is not a mere alteration — to extract liquid with one's mouth cannot be classified as *sechita* at all.

The Rema (320:1) cites the two views but does not decide between them. The *Mishna Berura* (12) writes, following the *Eliya Rabba*, that one must distinguish between different cases:

See the *Eliya Rabba*, who writes that since *sechita* of olives and grapes is prohibited by the Torah, it is appropriate to be stringent and avoid sucking even with one's mouth, in accordance with the first approach. However, with other foods, there is no reason to be stringent.

Nevertheless, it makes sense that even when it comes to olives and grapes there is no reason to be stringent unless one does so in "the way of suckling" — i.e., one sucks them and does not put them into one's mouth. However, if one puts them in one's mouth and sucks on the liquid, spitting out only the pits, according to everyone, this is the way of eating, as implied by the *Peri Megadim*.

According to him, one should be stringent and not suck olives and grapes in one's mouth, since the *sechita* of these fruit is forbidden by the Torah, but one may be lenient with other produce, whose *sechita* is prohibited only rabbinically. According to this, it would also be permitted also to suck sauce absorbed into a piece of bread or wine absorbed into challa.

The *Mishna Berura* adds that one needs to be stringent only when it comes to "the way of suckling" — i.e., one holds the fruit in one's hand and sucks the liquid from it. However, if one puts the entire fruit in one's mouth and sucks from it the liquid before one swallows it, this is not *derekh sechita*. Rather, it is the way of eating, and this method is allowed even for olives and grapes.

VII) Milking on Shabbat

Under what conditions may one milk cows on Shabbat?

Is it permissible for a nursing woman to squeeze milk into a vessel?

The Prohibition to Milk

The Gemara (95a) lists a number of actions whose violation on Shabbat is a matter of dispute. Rabbi Eliezer rules that their performance violates a Torah prohibition, while the Chakhamim (the other rabbis) maintain that their performance violates a rabbinic prohibition:

Our Rabbis taught: "One who milks, sets milk [for curdling] or makes cheese – [any of these at] the size of a dried fig; one who sweeps [the dirt floor], settles the dust [by sprinkling water] or removes loaves of honey – [regarding all of these] unwittingly on Shabbat, one is liable to bring a sin-offering... This is Rabbi Eliezer's view; however, the Chakhamim say that in both cases it is only prohibited rabbinically.

Note that milking appears on this list. As such, it would appear that the Chakhamim rule that milking is forbidden rabbinically. Indeed, Rav Hai Gaon (cited in the Rashba *ibid.*) and the Ramban (*ibid.*) rule accordingly.

However, most Rishonim understand that the Chakhamim argue only about the second part of the list (the housecleaning activities), while the *melakhot* which are mentioned in the beginning of the list (the dairy-production activities) are forbidden by the Torah according to all views. According to this, milking is forbidden by the Torah.

While the *Rishonim* dispute the reason for this prohibition, the accepted understanding is the view expressed by Tosafot (73b, s.v. *Mefarek*, in the name of the Ri) and the Rambam (8:10), that milking is forbidden because of *mefarek* (extracting), a subcategory of *dash*. As we have seen, the basis of the *melakha* of *dash* is the removal of an absorbed substance from its natural place. Thus, milking is forbidden because of *mefarek*, because one removes the milk from its natural place of growth.

Milking by a Non-Jew

Despite the prohibition of milking, a non-Jew is allowed to milk a Jew's cow because of the concern of animal pain (*tza'ar ba'alei chayim*).

Shulchan Arukh (305:20):

It is permissible to tell a non-Jew to milk [a Jew's] animal due to *tza'ar ba'alei chayim*, because the milk causes it pain; however, the milk may not be used on that day.

This ruling was widely practiced among Jewish communities worldwide for many generations. However, with the renewal of Jewish settlement in Israel, this solution has become very difficult to apply, whether because of the desire for Jewish labor or because of security issues and the like. Rav Kook, then

Ashkenazi Chief Rabbi of British Mandatory Palestine, was asked about this in 1925 (*Orach Mishpat*, OC, Ch. 64). His response is quite strong and unequivocal: one must utilize the services of a non-Jew to milk on Shabbat.

Milking on the holy Shabbat by a Jew is totally prohibited and a terrible desecration of Shabbat, and Heaven forbid that one take a lenient view of this. There is no other way of milking on Shabbat aside from having it done by a non-Jew.

Milking to Waste

Notwithstanding this firm stance, in cases where there is **no alternative**, Rav Kook does not object to a Jew milking on Shabbat in a way that the milk will go to **waste** (*le-ibbud*). The cows on Jewish farms at the time were Dutch dairy cows, which needed to be milked daily because of their copious milk production. This is one of the reasons that Rav Kook ultimately does not prevent those who permit milking *le-ibbud*. However, he sanctions this only in cases where there is no alternative, and only if the milk will actually go *le-ibbud*, "but Heaven forbid and forfend that one expand this dispensation any further." Indeed, the dispensation to milk *le-ibbud* is not based only on the fact that this is a *melakha she-einah tzerikha le-gufah* — one which is performed without any interest in its essence, but for the sake of an incidental result — but also on the view of Rishonim that we saw in our previous *shiurim* that when one is not interested at all in the *mashkeh* (liquid) being squeezed out, this is not considered to be a case of *mefarek* at all.

This ruling of Rav Kook created great difficulties for many agricultural settlements; the residents wanted to adhere to his ruling, but they found this application to be impracticable and that it led to an unbearable financial loss. Rav Uziel (then Chief Rabbi of Tel Aviv, later Sephardic Chief Rabbi of Israel) felt that there was a possibility of allowing a Jew to milk the cows and keep the milk, because of the tremendous loss and the interest of settling the Land of Israel (*Mishpetei Uziel*, Vol. I, OC, Ch. 10); however most rabbis opposed this, and Rav Kook (*Orach Mishpat*, *ibid.*) rejected it conclusively. The problem of milking on Shabbat, which was very difficult for Jewish agricultural settlements throughout Israel, aroused much debate and major controversy. Among other issues, it begged the question: can Jewish settlement exist without non-Jews?! (To our distress, nowadays there is a very widespread use of and reliance upon foreign workers, notwithstanding the ready availability of numerous modern halakhic solutions and other ways to solve this and other legal issues.)

Milking into Food

Rav Shaul Yisraeli (*Ammud Ha-ymini*, Ch. 24), who was the rabbi of Kefar Ha-ro'eh, later issued a ruling permitting milking on Shabbat into food (based on the principle that one is permitted to squeeze a *mashkeh* directly into food, which we saw in our previous *shiur*). This is the practice of many kibbutzim; they milk on Shabbat into bread (although the only commercial use available for this milk is to use it for cheese production, cutting profits in half).

The **Chazon Ish** (56:4) rules that one must exert effort to recruit a non-Jew for milking, but if this is not possible, one may milk *le-ibbud*.

Milking by Machine

In reality, none of the abovementioned solutions provided a fully satisfactory solution for the Jewish farms of the time. A satisfactory solution to the problem of milking on Shabbat emerged in the first decade of the State of Israel, with the **electric milking machine**. This solution is based on the fact that the first milking goes *le-ibbud*, and the rest of the milk is produced "on its own", as it were, by the machine. This method of milking was first applied in Kibbutz Chafetz Chayim with the consent of the **Chazon Ish**.

In recent decades, this solution has been further improved halakhically by adding the element of *gerama* (causation), so that the machine does not start operating immediately when the cups are attached to the cow's teats, but rather after some delay (also, a small part of the first milk to be pumped goes *le-ibbud*). This method is mentioned by the *Chazon Ish* (38:4) and Rav Yisraeli (*Ammud Ha-ymini*, Ch. 25) as being preferable.

These methods of milking by machine *le-ibbud* or via *gerama* are employed by many Shabbat-observant farms in our days, so that we have an elegant halakhic solution, giving a realistic response to the need to milk on Shabbat by a Jew without causing financial losses.

Milk Produced on Shabbat

Any milk produced on Shabbat, even if it was milked in a permissible way, may not be drunk on Shabbat itself (OC 305:20. If the milk was produced in a forbidden way, at times it is prohibited to drink it even on a weekday. This depends on the law of *maaseh Shabbat* (OC 318:1), a product of a *melakha*, which we will not deal with at length now.

NURSING

Nursing a baby in the normal way is permissible, and there is no question of any prohibition at all (OC 328:35). This is not considered *mefarek*, but rather *derekh akhila*, the way of eating. The mother can even help the baby by pressing on her breast (Rav S.Z. Auerbach, cited by *Megillat Sefer* 7:5).

However, pumping breast milk into a vessel is forbidden. The *Bei'ur Halakha* (328:34) writes in the name of the *Peri Megadim* that this action is forbidden by the Torah because of *mefarek*.

A woman who is in pain due to the extra milk in her breasts or who wants to pump the milk in order to maintain her ability to nurse (see the words of Rav S.Z. Auerbach, cited in *Me'or Ha-shabbat*, Vol. I, pp. 504-505) is allowed to pump milk *le-ibbud* (OC 330:8) — e.g., pumping the milk directly into the sink or into a vessel which contains some sort of substance that ruins

the milk's taste (e.g., soap). She may also use a breast pump (either a manual pump, or an electric pump which is turned on before Shabbat or by a timer), if there is an unpalatable substance in the receptacle as above.

A nursing woman may not pump milk into a vessel with the intent that her baby will drink it later, unless this baby is incapable of nursing and cannot consume milk substitutes. Clearly, the mother may not do this on Shabbat in order that she may involve herself in other pursuits during the week — indeed, there is a Torah prohibition to do so!


Summary

In conclusion, milking on Shabbat violates a Torah prohibition according to most halakhic authorities because of the prohibition of *mefarek*, which is a subcategory of *dash*. The original custom of kibbutzim and agricultural settlements was to employ a non-Jew to take care of the milking on Shabbat. When this was impossible, the halakhic authorities allowed one to milk *le-ibbud*. There are those who wanted to allow milking by a Jew, but this has not been the accepted practice. Another solution, adopted in Kefar Ha-ro'eh, was to milk onto bread. This issue has inspired many debates and controversies, and made things quite difficult for Jewish settlement in the Land of Israel.

After the establishment of the State of Israel, a revolution began with the use of the electric milking machine. Using this method, they would first milk *le-ibbud*, and after that the machine would operate on its own. This was the practice in Kibbutz Chafetz Chayim, in accordance with the view of the *Chazon Ish*.

Nowadays, there is another solution, using *gerama*. These solutions allow one to observe Shabbat in the best way and also employ Jews to do the milking without causing major financial losses.

There is no problem of nursing a baby. However, pumping breast milk into an empty vessel constitutes the violation of a Torah prohibition in the view of many halakhic authorities. If the mother is in pain due to extra milk, she may pump *le-ibbud*. If the baby is unable to nurse or consume milk substitutes, she is allowed to pump the milk for the baby to drink (though it is preferable to consult a rabbi in these situations). In other circumstances, it is absolutely forbidden.



Nursing on Shabbat: Permissible, but it is forbidden to pump into an empty vessel in order to keep the milk (unless the child will not nurse and there are no substitutes). It is permissible to pump and let it go to waste if there is extra milk.

VIII) The Prohibition of *Mashkim She-zavu*

May one consume the juice which is squeezed out of a grapefruit as one eats the fruit with a spoon?

What is the status of the juice at the bottom of a fruit cup?

The mishna (143b) cites a dispute about liquids which come out of produce on their own on Shabbat:

One may not squeeze produce to remove liquids from it, and if they come out on their own, they are forbidden. Rabbi Yehuda says: "That which is food, whatever emerges from it is permissible; that which is drink, whatever emerges from it is forbidden."

The Chakhamim forbid all liquids which come out, while Rabbi Yehuda allows the liquids when the produce is destined to be eaten, rather than for *sechita* (squeezing). This rabbinic prohibition of *mashkim she-zavu* (literally, liquids which have flowed) is explained by the Gemara (*Beitza* 3a) as being based on the Sages' concern that if one were allowed to drink liquids which flow out of produce of their own accord, one might come to squeeze produce actively, by hand. The Chakhamim in this mishna apply this prohibition to all produce, while Rabbi Yehuda believes that if the produce is designated to be eaten as food, one is actually displeased by its secreting liquid, so that there is no concern that one might come to squeeze it actively.

Returning to *Shabbat* 143b, the Gemara explains that Rabbi Yehuda concedes to the Chakhamim when it comes to olives and grapes: one should prohibit the juice which comes out even if they are designated to be eaten, since generally these species are used for their juices, so that we must be concerned that the person may actually be pleased by the liquids which come out, discard the original plan to eat them and decide to squeeze them by hand.

The *Shulchan Arukh* (320:1) rules in accordance with Rabbi Yehuda's view:

Olives and grapes may not be squeezed, and their juice is forbidden if it comes out on its own — even if they were only designated for eating. Berries and pomegranates may not be squeezed, and if their juice comes out on its own, it is permitted if they were designated for eating, but forbidden if they were designated for drinking.

Juice from Eating a Grapefruit

In light of this, if one eats a grapefruit with a spoon and some juice squirts out, this juice may be drunk, since the grapefruit is designated for eating, not for *sechita*, and the eater has no intent to juice the grapefruit, but merely to eat it. Thus, the prohibition of *mashkim she-zavu* should not be applicable to such a case.

As for the status of eating grapefruit with a spoon, Rav S.Z. Auerbach (cited in *Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhatah*, Ch. 5, n. 42) argues that although there is a *pesik reisha* (an inevitable, unintentional result) in this case that some juice will be squeezed out, since this juice is not removed from the fruit, but remains mixed in with it, there is no problem.

Juice from a Fruit Cup

Similarly, one may drink the liquid left at the bottom of a fruit salad, since the fruits are designated for eating, not for drinking. Aside from this, the juice has been originally mixed in with the fruit, not flowing out into another vessel, and therefore it is considered part of the food. According to this, one may allow the liquid even if grapes are among the fruits in the salad.

IX FREEZING AND THAWING ICE

May one put an ice cube in an empty cup in order to melt it?
Is it permissible to put ice cubes in a pitcher of juice?
May one put water in the freezer?

Melting Ice

The Gemara (51b) cites a *beraita*:
And neither snow nor hail may be crushed on Shabbat to cause their liquid to flow, but they may be placed in a goblet or dish, without concern.

The *beraita* forbids crushing ice on Shabbat, but allows one to put it into a cup so that it will melt on its own. Why?

The Rashba (ibid.) explains (the Ramban ibid. and Rambam 21:13 seem to indicate the same) that this prohibition stems from the issue of *sechita* (squeezing), part of the *melakha* of *dash*. Just as it is forbidden to squeeze a fruit (which is designated for liquid) and turn it into a drink, so too it is forbidden to crush ice and turn it into water:

It appears to me that this was disallowed based on the prohibition of *sechita* of fruit designated for drinking, because the hail and snow are designated to become water. Therefore, putting it in a cup is permissible, because one does not appear to be squeezing.

On this approach, one may place ice into a cup (even if it is empty) so that it will melt on its own, because this is not similar to *sechita*.

However, other Rishonim cite an alternate explanation for this prohibition, unrelated to the *melakha* of *dash*; Rashi (ibid. s.v. *Kedei*) explains that this is forbidden: "because this is *molid* ("creating" a new entity) on Shabbat, and it is like a *melakha*, that one creates the water."

This idea is expressed differently by the *Sefer Ha-teruma* (Ch. 234-235):

One may not crush snow and make it clear as water, because it is *nolad*... If so, it is forbidden to wash one's hands in snow or frozen water... because one dissolves them and turns them into water, so that it is *nolad*. It also appears that one may not put a kugel in winter next to the fire in order to warm it up on Shabbat day; since the fat in it has congealed and become thick and opaque, and now it melts and becomes clear, this is *nolad*.

On this approach, the prohibition is because of the law of *nolad*, and a similar prohibition exists in putting a food with congealed fat near the fire, since the fat becomes liquid, which is a problem of *nolad*. The simple reading of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* is that crushing ice is prohibited because of *nolad*. What is *nolad*? *Nolad* literally means “born,” and refers to an object that was “created” on Shabbat. The general problem with such a substance is that it is considered to be *muktzeh* (since it was not available for use at the beginning of Shabbat). This is the way the Ramban and Rashba mentioned above understand the view of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* (and dispute it).

According to this understanding, the problem with crushing ice does not lie in any action performed, but rather in the result brought about, namely, the water that was “created.” As such, the prohibition applies even if one puts the ice into an empty vessel without crushing it by hand; since the water is *nolad*, it makes no difference how this comes about. Only if one puts the ice in a cup which has a liquid in it does the Gemara allow one to use the water created, since the ice-water is not noticeable, as it is integrated in with the other liquid.

However, on closer examination, it is possible to understand the words of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* differently. It may be that when he talks about *nolad*, he does not refer to the result, namely that the water is *nolad*. Rather, he categorizes the act of crushing ice as *molid*, along the lines of Rashi's phrasing. And indeed the **Rosh** (4:13) seems to understand that the *Sefer Ha-teruma* prohibits melting ice because of *molid*. According to this, the prohibition is specifically when one crushes by hand; perhaps if one violates this ban and crushes the water, the water would be prohibited to drink as well. However, if the ice turns into water on its own, there would be no prohibition upon the resulting water.

If the prohibition is specifically the action of *holada*, why does the *Sefer Ha-teruma* forbid putting fatty food near the fire? Does the fat not melt on its own? From the words of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* later on, it appears that specifically putting it next to the fire is forbidden, because this is considered to be an action of heating; however, if someone leaves the food out and it thaws on its own, this is mere *gerama* (causation), and there is no prohibition in this. So too, it would be allowed, according to him, to put ice in an empty vessel, since the thawing takes place on its own, not by human action.

Summary and Practical Ruling

To conclude, one may not crush ice on Shabbat, because:

1. **Ramban, Rashba, Rambam:** It is similar to squeezing produce. According to this, it is permissible to put ice into an empty vessel, because this is not an action which is comparable to *sechita*.
2. **Rashi, Rosh** (explaining the **Sefer Ha-teruma**): It is similar to a *melakha*, because one “creates” the water, thus violating *molid*. According to this, one may put ice in an empty vessel, since the water is created on its own, and not through human actions.
3. **Ramban and Rashba** (explaining the **Sefer Ha-teruma**): It violates the prohibition of *molad* — a new product being “created” on Shabbat, which is *muktzeh*. According to this, the prohibition is applicable to putting ice into an empty vessel as well.

The **Shulchan Arukh** (318:16) rules against the view of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* and allows putting a fatty food by the fire in order to thaw it out.

One may put a kugel by the fire in a place where the hand withdraws [due to the heat], even though the fat which is congealed within it melts again.

Similarly, the **Shulchan Arukh** (320:9) allows one to melt ice:

One may not crush snow or hail, breaking them into little pieces so that the water will flow from them, but one may put them into a cup of wine or water so that they melt on their own, and one need not be concerned. Similarly, if one leaves them in the sun or by the fire and they melt, this is permissible.

The language of the **Shulchan Arukh** (“if one leaves it in the sun... this is permissible”) implies that he allows this only after the fact, but the **Mishna Berura** (35) writes that the *Shulchan Arukh*'s intent is to allow this in the first place, just as he allows one to put a food with congealed fat in it by the fire.

On the other hand, the **Rema** (318:16) writes that the custom is to follow the view of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* and not to leave a fatty food by the fire, unless there is some great need:

There are those who are stringent, and the custom is to be stringent. However, in a place of need, one may rely on the former view.

The **Mishna Berura** (320:35) writes that according to this, one must be stringent about ice as well, that one may not melt it by the sun or by the fire, but only in a full cup.

According to this view, may one put ice in an empty vessel so that it will melt on its own? The *Acharonim* debate this.

Rav Neuwirth writes (*Shmirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhata* 10:3, n. 7) that just as the *Mishna Berura* forbids melting ice in the sun, melting ice in an empty vessel at room temperature should also be forbidden. According to him, the *Mishna Berura* rules in accordance with the Ramban and Rashba's explanation of the *Sefer Ha-teruma*, namely, that the prohibition of crushing the ice is because of *nolad*, and thus it is prohibited even if the ice melts on its own.

The **Shevet Ha-levi** (Vol. VII, Ch. 40) writes that the *Mishna Berura* rules in accordance with the Rosh's interpretation of the *Sefer Ha-teruma*, that the prohibition exists only in a situation in which there is *molid* of the water, not in a situation in which the ice melts on its own. According to him, the *Mishna Berura* forbids specifically thawing in the sun, which is considered to be leaving it in a heated place, similar to placing it near the fire; however, taking it out of the freezer into room temperature is not forbidden according to him, because this action does not cause the thawing in a direct way, but only removes the cooling agent and allows the thawing to happen on its own.

The Sephardic practice is to permit removing ice from the freezer, leaving it in an empty vessel so that it will melt. Similarly, it permits heating food with congealed fat and the like. For example, Sephardim may heat chicken on Shabbat even if there is a lot of congealed sauce on it.

On the other hand, Ashkenazic practice is generally to be stringent in accordance with the view of the *Sefer Ha-teruma*. As such, Ashkenazim should not put ice cubes in an empty cup, but only in a cup with a liquid in it, as Rav Neuwirth rules. However, this stringency does not apply when there is a Shabbat-related need, and thus in such cases one may thaw a frozen liquid (e.g., a container of milk). It is permissible even to leave it near a heat source in order for it to thaw rapidly (on the condition that there is no problem of cooking, i.e., that it is placed in a position where it is impossible for it to reach the temperature at which one withdraws one's hand); this is because, as we noted, the matter is allowed according to most Rishonim, and the **Rema** rules that one may rely on their view in a time of need.

According to all views, one may not crush ice by hand in order to turn it into water (OC 320:9). However, one may walk on snow even though one crushes it (ibid. 13), because one has no intent to liquefy it (**Mishna Berura**, 39), and it is unavoidable (Taz, 10).

MAKING ICE

Is one allowed to put water in the freezer so that it will turn into ice?

This is apparently a function of the argument of the *Rishonim* which we have seen: according to the Ramban and the Rashba, it is clear that the matter is permissible, because this is not comparable to squeezing produce (this is the opposite action!), and there is no prohibition of *nolad*; according to the *Sefer Ha-teruma*, there is good reason to forbid this because of *nolad*,

since this action causes a **new creation** of ice. As such, this would be permissible for Sephardic Jews, while for Ashkenazic Jews, one can allow this only in a time of need.


However, the **Dovev Meisharim** (Vol. I, Ch. 55) writes that freezing water is forbidden even according to the Ramban and the Rashba. According to him, these *Rishonim* rule leniently only about ice which turns into water, since even when it is still ice, if the person thinks to use it for drinking, it is considered a liquid (according to the Gemara in Nidda 17a); consequently, in its melting, a new liquid is not created. On the other hand, when a person turns the water into ice — which is not being used as a drink right now — one takes something which is defined as a liquid and nullifies the status of liquid, and this act is forbidden because of *no'lad* even according to the Ramban and the Rashba. According to this, even Sephardic Jews may not freeze water, even in a time of need.

However, in practice, it appears that freezing water is permissible even for Ashkenazim, at least in a time of need. First, it is logical that the Ramban and the Rashba dispute the very basis of the *Sefer Ha-teruma's* view, and they believe that there is no prohibition of *no'lad* unless an entirely new entity is created, not if something merely changes its form. (Indeed, there are those who understand this in the view of the *Sefer Ha-teruma* himself, as we have seen above.) Beyond this, it may be that freezing water is less significant than thawing ice and is allowed even according to the *Sefer Ha-teruma*, since water's solid state is a temporary situation, not natural for it, and it requires extreme cooling in order to exist. Simply, it may be that the prohibition of *no'lad* is not applicable to something which does not last.

Practically, it appears that one may be lenient about this, at least when there is a need for Shabbat. Many halakhic authorities of the recent generation rule accordingly, among them the **Shevet Ha-levi** (Vol. III, Ch. 55), **Rav S.Z. Auerbach** (*Shemirat Shabbat Ke-hilkhatah*, Ch. 10, n. 14), the **Tzitz Eliezer** (Vol. VI, Ch. 34; Vol. VIII, Ch. 12), the **Chelkat Yaakov** (OC, Ch. 128-129) and the **Minchat Yitzchak** (Vol. VIII, Ch. 24).

Summary

To conclude, one may not crush ice on Shabbat, but it is permissible to walk on snow. Sephardim can put ice or fat in a bowl so that it will melt (or heat it up in one of the permitted ways), and so too, they are allowed to freeze water in order to create ice. Ashkenazim are accustomed not to put ice cubes in an empty cup, but only in a vessel which contains a liquid; similarly, their custom is to prepare ice before Shabbat and not on Shabbat itself. However, when there is a need for Shabbat itself, Ashkenazim can also put ice in an empty vessel or thaw a milk container and the like, and they may also freeze water in order to create ice.





May one pour water over flour without mixing? Is it permissible to wash one's hands over sand or dirt?

I) Defining the *Melakha*

The *melakha* of *lash* (kneading; the process is known as *lisha*) pertains to an action that has an opposite objective to that of the *melakha* of *tochen* (grinding), as well as the *melakhot* of *dash* (threshing), *zoreh* (winnowing), *borer* (selecting) and *merakked* (sifting). The other *melakhot* listed here are performed in order to **separate substances**. *Dash*, *zoreh*, *borer* and *merakked* separate between the wheat (or the flour) and various types of refuse, while *tochen* reduces the wheat kernels to grains of flour. ***Lisha*, on the other hand, is a binding *melakha*.** In the process of kneading, one **fuses together separate, tiny parts and turns them into one unit**. (Note that the definition of the *melakha* is a subject of debate as we shall see below.)

The *melakha* of *lash* is not limited to foods, e.g., the preparation of dough from flour and water; rather, it applies to other substances as well — for example, **kneading water and dirt** is forbidden by the Torah, as a subcategory of *lash* (**Rambam 8:16**, according to the **Gemara**, 18a).

It is not only *lisha* per se that is banned by the Torah; **rolling the dough** (with a rolling pin) is also forbidden by Torah law, since it is part of the greater process of the *melakha*. (**Yerushalmi 7:2**).

Before delving into the details of the *melakha*, certain terms need to be defined. A substance may or not be *bar gibbul* (kneadable), and the mass formed may be of two consistencies: *belila ava* (a thick mixture) or *belila rakka* (literally, a soft mixture, i.e., a thin one). Several questions need to be raised regarding these terms: Does *lisha* apply to that which is not *bar gibbul*? What is the difference between *belila ava* and *belila rakka*, practically and halakhically? What is prohibited by Torah law, what is prohibited by rabbinic law, and what is permissible? We will see the various views and the rulings as we continue.

II) Mixing Flour and Water Without Kneading

The Gemara (155b) cites a dispute among the Mishnaic authorities as to the question of when one can become liable for *lash*:

If one puts in the flour and another puts in the water, the latter is liable, according to Rabbi. Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: "One is not liable without kneading."

Thus, according to Rabbi (Yehuda Ha-nasi), combining water and flour is enough to make one liable for *lash*, while according to Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, one cannot become liable until one actually kneads them together until they form dough.

The Root of the Argument

What is the basis of this dispute? It may be that this argument stems from divergent understandings of the nature of the *melakha* of *lisha*. According to **Rabbi**, the essence of the *melakha* is the very **blending** of two different substances, while according to **Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda**, the essence of the *melakha* is the fact that two substances **stick to each other and agglomerate**. This is the **Eglei Tal's** explanation of the dispute (*Lash*, 9:13). However, this explanation raises certain difficulties in the explanation of the *melakha*.

Alternatively, it may be that according to all views, the essence of the *melakha* of *lash* is that the two substances **adhere and form one mass**, but according to **Rabbi**, one may be liable for **any significant act** which hastens this result, even if it has not yet been achieved. This principle emerges from the *melakha* of *bishul* (cooking), in which one may be liable for acts of partial cooking (anything above the minimal level of edibility). On the other hand, according to **Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda**, one may be liable only for an action which brings about **the ultimate result** of a single mass.

Halakhic Ruling

The *Rishonim* and the *Acharonim* argue as to which view is followed in this dispute.

The **Rif** (67b), the **Rambam** (21:34) and the **Rosh** (24:3) rule in accordance with the view of **Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda** (since the anonymous mishna on 155b follows his view), that there is a liability **only for producing dough**.

On the other hand, the **Yere'im** (Ch. 274, 133b), the **Teruma** (Ch. 220), the **Semag** (Prohibition 65, *lash*) and the **Semak** (Ch. 280) rule in accordance with the view of **Rabbi** (because of the general Talmudic principle that the halakha follows Rabbi Yehuda Ha-nasi when he has one opponent), so that one is liable **for the very act of putting water into flour**.

The **Shulchan Arukh** (321:16, 324:3) cites the lenient view (that of Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda) without any comment, and after that he introduces the stringent view (that of Rabbi) with the words "There are those who say." The general principle is that the *Shulchan Arukh* endorses the view which he includes without attribution; this would suggest that the *Shulchan Arukh* rules leniently, **that there is no Torah prohibition in putting water into flour without kneading it.** And indeed this is the ruling of the **Maamar Mordekhai** (321:13), **Rav Ovadya Yosef** (*Livyat Chen* 67). And the **Menuchat Ahava** (Vol. II, Ch. 9, end n. 9).

On the other hand, the **Rema** (321:16) rules in accordance with the view of Rabbi, that **putting water into flour is forbidden by the Torah.** The **Ben Ish Chai** (Year 2, Mishpatim 18) indicates that Sefardim must also rule stringently in accordance with this view, and this is the ruling of the **Kaf Hachayim** (324:14) and the view of **Rav Mordekhai Eliyahu.**

We should note that **Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda**, who believes that there is no Torah prohibition of pouring water on flour, would concede that there is a **rabbinic prohibition**, because he says, "One is **not liable** without kneading" — but he does not say that it is permissible. This is noted by the **Ritva** (155b) and the **Me'iri** (18a) and cited by the **Beit Yosef** (Ch. 324, s.v. *Aval*).

Thus, putting water into flour without *lisha* is forbidden for both Ashkenazim and Sefardim; however, while for Ashkenazim it is a Torah prohibition, for Sefardim it appears that it is prohibited rabbinically. (Nevertheless, even Ashkenazim rely on the lenient view in certain cases, as we will see below.)

III) Pouring Water on Sand or Dirt

CHILDREN IN THE SANDBOX

Children are allowed to play in a sandbox on Shabbat because it is designed for play and it is therefore not *muktzeh* (308:38). However, they are not allowed to play with sand on the beach or with dirt at a construction site, etc. because it is *muktzeh* on Shabbat, in the classic sense — i.e., it cannot be used because it lacks a recognized Shabbat use (**Mishna Berura** *ibid.* 144).

As we have seen, there is a prohibition (whether Torah-based or rabbinic in nature) to pour water on flour, and the same applies to sand. Therefore, while children are allowed to play in a sandbox, **it is forbidden for them to pour water over it**, even if they do not actively knead it by hand.

WASHING HANDS OR URINATING OVER SAND OR DIRT

This issue comes up frequently for people on hikes, in the army, or eating in the *sukka* — may one **wash one's hands on the "floor" when it is dirt or sand?** Watering the ground may fall under the *melakhot* of plowing or sowing at times, but when the ground in question has nothing planted in it and

is not designated for cultivation, these *melakhot* are not a concern. However, one must investigate if there is a reason to prohibit this act because of *lash*. As we have seen, pouring water on sand (just like pouring it on flour) is forbidden according to everyone: according to Rabbi, by Torah law; and according to Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, by rabbinical law.

This question also arises in situations when one must urinate in the field. The **Yere'im** (Ch. 274, 133b) indicates that one may not urinate anywhere where there may be a problem of *lisha* (i.e., where the ground is not hard). However, the *Acharonim* debate this, as the **Mishna Berura** cites (321:57):

The **Magen Avraham** writes, "It appears to me that it is forbidden to urinate upon mud, because of kneading..."

The same would apply to loose dirt and sand. While it is true that one has no intention of *lisha*, it is an inevitable result. As for a spittoon or a basin sitting on fine or coarse sand, it requires further study if this should be permitted or prohibited, because it might be an inevitable result which one has no interest in [which is sometimes allowed].

However, I have found that in the book **Beit Meir** that he allows it for this reason, in a case of need, to urinate even upon mud.

It appears that one may rely on this [lenient view] when the mud does not belong to the one urinating, for in such a case one certainly has no interest in its *lisha*.

Thus, the **Magen Avraham** forbids urinating on mud because of *lisha*, and the **Mishna Berura** adds that according to this one may not urinate on loose dirt or sand. On the other hand, the **Beit Meir** allows this because the person does not intend to perform *lisha*, and the halakha essentially follows Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda, who holds that pouring water on mud and the like is only prohibited rabbinically. Thus, the case is one of an undesired, inevitable result of a rabbinical prohibition, which is allowed in a case of need.

The **Mishna Berura** rules that one may rely on the **Beit Meir** in a case of need **as long as the dirt is someone else's**, because then we say that the one urinating certainly does not "desire" to change the consistency of another's dirt.

Therefore, **one should be careful not to urinate on sand or on loose dirt, but when there is a great need** (such as there is no other convenient place), **one may be lenient**. In any case, one may urinate on hard ground.


What about **washing hands**? Here too, it is best to look for a place in which the water will not be spilled on sand or soft dirt, but in a place of need, one may be lenient. However, there is a simpler solution. **Rav S.Z. Auerbach** allows using a sink which empties out among plants, as long as the

water goes through a pipe first. This renders the act one of **causation**, and one may be lenient about this if one does not intend to water the plants. In a similar way, if one washes one's hands over **metal or stone**, even if the water flows down to sand or soft dirt, this is permitted, since this is considered causation and one has no interest in wetting the ground. (In a case where one is interested in watering the ground, the act would be forbidden.)

Thus, it is permissible to wash one's hands over stone, even if the water will flow afterward into sand or soil with plants in them. Even if the stone has some dirt on it, there is no problem, since the mixture formed will be primarily liquid, so there is no true blending. Similarly, it is permissible to wash one's hands into a sink which empties into sand or plants, as long as one does not own them, does not benefit from the irrigation and is not interested in it.

Summary

In conclusion, it is forbidden to pour water on sand, and therefore children who are playing in a sandbox may not pour water in it. To wash one's hands, or urinate, on the ground, one should look for a place free of sand or loose dirt. However, in a case of need, one may be lenient (especially when one needs to relieve oneself), and there is also room for leniency if the water will first flow onto stone or metal and only after that reach the ground.



V) *Belila Ava* and *Belila Rakka*

How may one prepare porridge for a child on Shabbat? May one mix juice with mashed fruit? Is one allowed to mix tea-biscuit crumbs with cheese? Is there a prohibition of *lisha* in preparing coffee?

The mass formed by an act of *lisha* may be of two consistencies: *belila ava* (a thick mixture) or *belila rakka* (literally, a soft mixture, i.e., a thin one). Naturally, there is also a third possibility when mixing two substances: that no true mixture is created at all. Respectively, these three types yield three different halakhic statuses:

1. By Torah law, it is forbidden to create a *belila ava*.
2. By rabbinic law, it is prohibited to create a *belila rakka*.
3. It is permissible to create a fully liquid or runny *belila*, as this is not considered a true *belila* at all. As the **Chazon Ish** points out (58:9): “Powders which dissolve in water may be mixed with water on Shabbat, and there is no problem of *lisha* in this.”

This distinction emerges from the Gemara (155b-156a). The Gemara indicates that **Rabbi** and **Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda** argue whether one may prepare dough from **flour made of parched grains** with an alteration, but they agree that one may prepare the dough known as *shatit* with an alteration. The Gemara attempts to resolve this apparent discrepancy as follows:

Yet they agree that *shatit* may be stirred on Shabbat... But you said that one may not mix? **There is no difficulty: one case is *ava*, and the other is *rakka*.** Still, that is only if one does it in an unusual manner. How does one do it in an unusual manner?
Rav Yosef said: “During the week the vinegar is [first] poured in and then the *shatit*, whereas on Shabbat, the *shatit* is [first] poured in and then the vinegar.”

In other words, dough made from parched-grain flour is a *belila ava*, and that is why **Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda** and **Rabbi** dispute whether one may knead it with an alteration, *shinnui*. On the other hand, *shatit* dough is a *belila rakka*, and therefore, according to all views, it is permissible to knead it with a *shinnui*, e.g., stirring in the ingredients in the opposite order of the standard recipe.

Why is such a *shinnui* effective only for a *belila rakka* and not for a *belila ava*? Apparently, the prohibition of *lisha* of a *belila ava* is **from the Torah**, while the prohibition of *lisha* of a *belila rakka* is **of rabbinic origin**. This also seems to be the implication of the explanation in the **Chiddushim Ha-meyuchasim La-Ran** (156a), as well as the view of the **Terumat Ha-deshen** (Ch. 53): making a *belila rakka* is not considered *lisha*. (The **Shevitat Ha-shabbat** writes the same, in his

Introduction to the *Melakha of Lash*, 7). The **Chazon Ish** writes something similar (58:2) as well:

And it appears that the *shinnui* of putting the *shatit* in first and then putting in the vinegar is not considered a true *shinnui*, and therefore they only allow it for *rakka*, because it is not in the category of *lash* by Torah law; but with *ava*, such a *shinnui* would not help [because thick dough may not be kneaded by Torah law].

Defining *Belila Ava* and *Belila Rakka*

What definition can be given to determine whether a mixture is considered to be a *belila rakka* or a *belila ava*?

The **Chazon Ish** writes (58:9, s.v. 156) writes:

It appears that *rakka* can be poured and emptied, but it is still a mass and not a liquid. But if there is so much water that it merely looks like cloudy water, it is not at all in the category of *lash*.

In other words, a *belila rakka* is a *belila* **which can be poured**. Even when there is a **mass**, if it can be poured and decanted from one vessel to another, this is a *belila rakka*, provided that the pouring is not in clumps, but rather “poured and emptied” — i.e., poured without interruption. If the mixture is a true **liquid**, the mixture is not a *belila* at all, but rather a suspension, solution or combination of two liquids, as we noted above.

The **Ketzot Ha-shulchan** (Ch. 130; *Baddei Ha-shulchan*, 3) provides a different distinction. According to him, a *belila rakka* is one which is **thinner** than its usual consistency:

It appears that the measure of the *belila* is not the same for all things; rather, for each substance, the way of its *lisha* makes one liable, and if one alters and makes it a bit thinner, it becomes a *belila rakka*...

The logic of this is that just as a *shinnui* in the order of putting in the ingredients is considered a *shinnui*, so too the making of a *belila* which is thinner than is customary is considered a *shinnui*. Thus, since it is defined as a *shinnui*, creating a *belila rakka* is only prohibited rabbinically, and where there is another *shinnui* (or two) its creation is permissible by the rules of *shinnui*.

The underlying dispute between the **Chazon Ish** and the **Ketzot Ha-shulchan** is that according to the **Ketzot Ha-shulchan**, the allowance for *belila rakka* is based on the law of ***shinnui***, and therefore one must check the ordinary consistency of each mixture, and from there one can extrapolate what is considered a *shinnui*. According to the **Chazon Ish**, on the other hand, the allowance is not based on the law of *shinnui* but **on the very definition of the melakha of *lash***: the Torah prohibition of *lisha* is limited to

creating a thick mass such as dough. However, mixing the ingredients for a *belila rakka* is considered stirring, not kneading (as the Gemara notes that “*shatit* may be stirred”). Therefore, there is no significance to the question of what the normal way is; the measure of the liquidity of the mixture is the only meaningful issue.

Practical Halakha

In practice, the halakhic authorities follow the definition of the **Chazon Ish**, particularly since the definition of the **Ketzot Ha-shulchan** varies from food to food, and it is difficult to apply it pragmatically.

Therefore, **a mixture which cannot be poured from one vessel to another is a *belila ava*, which may not be made by Torah law.** This category includes pudding, instant mashed potatoes or thick porridge.

If it can be poured continuously from one vessel to another, it is a *belila rakka*, the making of which is only banned rabbinically. This category includes thin porridge.

If it is not a true mass, **but a very liquid substance, this is not in the category of *belila* at all, and it is permissible to make it.** This category includes coffee or any other liquid prepared with a powder or finely ground material.

The principles which we have seen here in terms of the different types of *belila* are very important in terms of the practical halakha, but first we must examine a final element, which we have already alluded to: *belila* with a *shinnui*.